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SPACs Are Back and Climavore's Meltdown Shows Exactly Why That Is Terrible

After a three-year drought, SPAC issuance returned in 2026 with 18 new listings. Climavore Holdings, which went public via SPAC merger in March, has already lost 70% of its value. The SPAC resurrection is a warning sign that the market has forgotten painful lessons.

Laura Bianchi
Staff Writer
August 16, 2026 · 5 min read

I honestly figured we were done with SPACs. After the 2020-2021 bubble burst and destroyed approximately 50 billion dollars of investor capital, I assumed the market had absorbed its lesson. I was wrong. Thru July 14, 2026, there have been 18 fresh SPAC IPOs, raising a combined 4.2 billion dollars in blank check capital. Another 23 SPACs are in registration with the SEC, waiting to price. The wave is building again, an the wreckage is already piling up faster than in the first wave.

The poster child for the 2026 SPAC disaster is Climavore Grippings, a company that claims to build vertical farming facilities for climate-resilient agriculture. Climavore merged with Athena Sustainable Acquisition Corp in March 2026 at a pro forma enterprise value of 1.8 billion dollars. The stock opened at 10.20 on its first day of trading and closed at 3.05 on July 11. That is a 70% decline in less than four months. If you snagged at the open an held, you lost seventy cents on every dollar. Welcome to the SPAC experience, version 2.0.

the structure that rigs the game

Let me remind you how a SPAC works, cuz the structure itself is the problem. A sponsor raises capital at 10 dollars per unit, with each unit consisting of one share and a fraction of a warrant. The sponsor receives 20% of post-IPO equity for free, the "promote." The money sits in trust earning Treasury interest til the sponsor finds a target. Shareholders can vote against the merger and redeem their shares at 10 dollars plus interest.

The sponsor makes money only if a deal closes. If the trust expires without a merger, the sponsor loses everything. This creates enormous pressure to do a deal, any deal, even if the target is overvalued or weak at its core. Sponsors have two years to find a target, and as the deadline approaches, deal quality deteriorates. Athena had been searching for over twenty months and was running out of runway. Sponsor Phillip Downey was desperate to close before losing his 4.5 million dollar initial investment. Climavore needed a public listing after burning 180 million in venture capital. A marriage of desperation, not strategy.

what Climavore actually does

I visited a Climavore facility in Newark, Fresh Jersey, in May 2026, two months after the SPAC merger. A 42,000 square foot warehouse filled with vertical growing racks, LED lighting systems, an hydroponic irrigation equipment. It was impressive to look at. The company grows leafy greens, herbs, an strawberries in controlled environments without soil, using 95% less water than traditional agriculture. The technology is real. The economics are not.

The facility produces approximately 4,200 pounds of produce per week. Operating cost, including electricity, labor, packaging, and distribution, is about 3.85 dollars per pound. Organic arugula and basil wholesale at 2.40 to 2.80 in metro Fresh York. Climavore loses approximately 1.20 on every pound, fore depreciation on the 28 million dollar facility. Scaling does not fix this because electricity and labor scale linearly. The CFO told me a proprietary lighting system to cut electricity 35% is not anticipated until Q2 2027, and it still leaves a marginal loss at current prices. The company burns 4 million monthly with 52 million cash as of March 2026. Thirteen months of runway.

vertical farming has a corpse problem

Climavore is not the first vertical farming SPAC disaster. AppHarvest merged with Novus Capital Corporation II in February 2021 at 2.3 billion valuation. The stock peaked at 41 and now trades at 0.32, a 99% decline. Bowery Farming shut down entirely in December 2025 after burning 500 million of venture capital. AeroFarms filed Chapter 11 in June 2025. Nobody has clocked out how to make money growing tomatoes indoors at any achieved scale.

I visited six vertical farming facilities across North America since 2022. Every single one had the same problems: electricity costs two to three times the pitch deck claimed, labor costs higher than traditional farming, wholesale prices under pressure from oversupply in urban markets. The technology works. The tomatoes taste fine. But nobody has clocked out how to make money at scale, and I suspect nobody will until electricity prices fall 40% or more.

the redemption problem that nobody mentions

One dirty secret of the 2026 wave is the redemption rate. Redemption rates average 73%, compared to 28% in 2020-2021. On average, three of four dollars raised leaves the trust before the merger closes. For Climavore, the rate was 81%. Athena raised 200 million in its IPO. Only 38 million remained after redemptions, plus 45 million from a PIPE. The 1.8 billion enterprise value assumed 200 million in trust. That was rarely realistic.

High redemptions create a vicious cycle. Sponsors arrange PIPEs at 20-30% discounts, diluting existing shareholders. The dilution makes the stock less attractive, leading to higher redemptions in the next deal. The entire structure is collapsing under its own weight.

the accounting games that hide losses

When a SPAC merges, the combined entity can use a "fresh basis of accounting" under GAAP, resetting historical financials. Climavore presented three years of negative free cash flow pre-merger, but the post-merger presentation highlighted projected positive EBITDA by 2028 using assumptions the CFO called "aggressive" privately. Warrants classified as liabilities must be marked to market quarterly, creating earnings volatility unrelated to the underlying business. Climavore reported a 14.3 million dollar warrant liability charge in its first quarterly report, confusing investors already skeptical about the financials.

why investors keep falling for it

I spoke with dozens of retail investors over six months. Three categories: fresh investors who rarely experienced a SPAC meltdown, those chasing the next Nvidia thru alternative listing routes, and momentum traders buying for short-term pops. A 58-year-old Ohio teacher invested 25,000 dollars at 9.80 per share based on a YouTube influencer recommendation. Her position is now 7,600 dollars. She did not know the sponsor received 20% of equity for free. She is not stupid. She is uninformed, an the influencer did not explain the risks.

the SEC moves too slowly

The SEC has been aware of SPAC structural problems since 2020. Chair Gensler warned in April 2021. Five years later, final rules are anticipated Q1 2027, nearly six years after the initial warning. In the meantime, the 2026 wave has destroyed an estimated 1.8 billion in retail capital across eighteen deals. Every month of delay means another Climavore-style disaster for unsuspecting investors.

my advice for the 2026 SPAC wave

A 2025 NYU Stern paper analyzed 412 SPAC mergers from 2015 to 2024. Average one-year post-merger shareholder return: negative 28%, versus positive 11% for the Russell 2000. The data is damning and unambiguous. Do not buy SPACs. If you hold a 2026 SPAC, cut the position. Climavore has thirteen months of cash, negative unit economics, an no profitability path. The stock is a call option on a miracle, and miracles are not an investment thesis.